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ABSTRACT
This article describes the confluence of online activism and street 
protests in Lebanon. While Arab protesters have systematically 
been portrayed as young, urban and wired since the 2011 
uprisings, Lebanese activists are also often regarded as trapped 
between war and sectarianism. This article challenges both 
frameworks and looks closer at the ways pre- existing waves of 
discontent crystallised into the mobilisation of thousands of 
Lebanese onto the streets of Beirut in 2010 and 2011. To achieve 
this, the article critiques the over-emphasis on network politics 
that accompanies internet-related hypotheses. The fashioning of a 
new kind of politics outside the dominant political factions (‘8–14 
March’ blocs) was crucial  for activists  in  Lebanon.  New 
independent  initiatives that locate feminist and queer politics within 
an overall analysis of imperialism and capitalism, as well as 
experimentation with digital technologies, helped forge a unique 
and non-sectarian camaraderie. By conveying the circumstances 
that have shaped  political  involvement, this article avoids the 
projection of non-ideological/networked  politics that dominate 
concepts of online activism. The  internet  played  a  dual role in 
Lebanese grassroots politics, as  illustrated  through  the 
experiences of the feminist collective Nasawiya.
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The mass protests that took place across the Arab world in 2011 were explained at the time in 
different ways, but, overall, they were understood as self-emancipatory uprisings constituting 
one of the most invigorating phenomena of recent times. Six years down the road it looks 
as if mainstream media has come back from its earlier celebrations –disappointing 
refutations of the revolutionary protests that have harboured counter-revolutions can also be 
heard in activist milieus. Due to their unsettled out- comes, it is much more productive to 
identify the impending impact of such historic episodes in a long- durée perspective rather 
than accepting either celebration or (retrospective) regret (Chalcraft, 2016). Such a long view 
is appropriate given that the mass uprisings would not have been possible without the 
accumulated effect of many smaller, shorter, quieter episodes in the preceding years: these 
previous efforts formed the small building blocks for the uprisings, and they themselves need to 
be retrieved and taken into consideration in any analysis of contemporary politics in the 
region.
Despite the overwhelming media attention that was focused on the initial uprisings, it is 
notable that hardly any mass media outlet at the time mentioned Lebanon. One of the few 
exceptions was an item on BBC Arabic (Figure 1), which showed a video of activists in 
Beirut’s Hamra district busily organising their activities on laptops and using Wi-Fi in cafes.
The video included the now familiar over-emphasis on online media and the image of the 
young, wired, middle classes as the key ingredients of activism. The online user-generated 
platforms through which calls for protest were announced and disseminated were central 
in this narrative. And yet,
Figure 1. BBC Arabic clips of Facebook group and café gathering place. Aired on 28 February, the clip is available on: <http://www. 
youtube.com/watch?v=XWeZPDsCuBI>.
despite the hyped-up framing of social media revolutions, this particular item was much more 
in tune with the political realities than may have appeared to be the case at first glance. 
Despite the clichés about the importance of internet activism, by focusing on Lebanon, the 
video actually offered a break from dominant assessments. The absenteeism is probably 
because Lebanon is often regarded (e.g. in policy papers) as being caught between a rock 
(war) and a hard place (sectarianism), which implies that sectarianism is an all-
encapsulating and intrinsic part of Lebanon.1 The 2011 protests (tempor- arily) challenged 
these approaches.
As mass revolts rocked the region, pre-existing waves of discontent (re-)mobilised 
thousands of Lebanese, who came out onto the streets of Beirut. This article looks at the 
Lebanese articulation of the sentiment expressed in the Arab protests, Al Shàb Yurid Isqat 
al-Nizam (‘the people demand the downfall of the system’). Across the Arab world, 
including in Lebanon, protesters were negating the generally assumed impossibility of 
fulfilling a revolutionary potential. The protests in Lebanon were remarkably similar to 
those in Tunisia and Egypt: for a brief moment something extraordinary was happening. 
The universality of the chants was clear in the way that they echoed in very different contexts 
across the region and were sometimes adapted to national circumstances. In Morocco the 
people chanted ‘Al Shàb Yurid Isqat al-Fasad (the corrupt system), and in Lebanon the 
chant was ‘Al Shàb Yurid Isqat al-Nizam al-Ta’ifi (the people demand the downfall of the 
sectarian system). That period offered a messy confluence of online outrage and large 
offline street protests. The aim of this article is to deconstruct this two-fold online-offline 
phenomenon. One of my main objectives
is to convey, through ethnographic examples, how some of the activists I met got involved in 
activism in the first place. These activists have contributed to a different kind of politics in 
Lebanon, with new initiatives that take place outside the dominant groups. It is not my 
intention to lump all Lebanese activists together—there is diversity of views and in some of 
the coalitions a range of political tra- ditions come together. However, this research is 
predisposed towards a discussion of leftist activists. Much more than group or community 
affiliation, it is the subjective experiences of these activists that have shaped their political 
involvement in particular ways and times.
Discussions of online activism seem to imply a less concerned engagement with 
ideology, class and political organisations than offline engagement, which is increasingly 
represented as hierarchic and outdated. These conceptual parameters are almost always 
Euro-American inspired. How  to assess whether the internet limits or accommodates 
sectarianism—an issue that deeply preoccupied the activists I worked with in Lebanon? 
The experiences of activists need to be placed within a broader understanding of the 
imminence of war and the manners in which it coincided with, and thereby intensified, the 
evolution of the internet without losing sight of the influence of class or ideol- ogy not to 
mention ‘traditional’ forms of organizing. This angle allows us to pay attention to the 
importance of material infrastructures and the power relations that they enable. To grasp 
how the technological relates to the political in real-life activism, I engage with the case of a 
feminist, non-sec- tarian collective, Nasawiya, that exemplifies the ways activists and the 
internet transform across events and experiences.
Theoretical acrobatics
Explanatory models emanating from media and communication studies frequently build on ideas 
around ‘networking power’ inspired by Castells’ Communication Power (2009), itself heavily 
influenced by the mother-concept of Networks earlier. These models sometimes seem to 
bypass material dynamics such as poverty or infrastructure. The post-modern condition of 
deterritorialisation (captured in terms like ‘flows of spaces’) encouraged such paradigms. But 
the idea that communication is a central axis of pol- itical power was rejected by critics who 
consider the internet to be an extension of the state and key to capitalism (Fuchs, 2009). The 
status quo in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) has long been affected by 
colonialism, imperialism and counter-revolution. In any analysis of events in the region, we 
cannot overlook the centrality of state-controlled capitalist infrastructures and the legacy of 
imperial hegemony (Aouragh & Chakravartti, 2016). Recent analysis of online activism has 
tended to focus on visi- bility and digital connectivity at the expense of content, organisation 
and political ideology.
These qualifications are especially crucial for the study of technology in the Middle East, 
where popular projections about internet politics were plentyful. The reality in the region is a 
far cry from the picture presented by ‘horizontal’, ‘autonomous’, ‘immaterial’ paradigms, that 
Mejias (2012) calls the utopia of liberation technology. When we refrain from engaging with 
the enforced realities of capitalism and imperial dominance, we perform conceptual 
gymnastics and our theories will lack empirical value. One solution is to place the 
legitimate critique of  the  celebration  of  low-key online engagement (‘clicktivism’), and of 
reductionist claims regarding the power of communication and information dissemination, 
alongside a discussion of necessary online mobilisation tools, virtual archives, or alternative 
(citizen media) news.2
The 1960s US civil rights movement has become a wearisome point of comparison in 
critiques of internet activism, one that contrasts physical, dangerous and strong-tied networks 
with loosely organised, digital weak tied-networks. Yet, this derivative metaphor strikes a 
very familiar chord in Lebanon, where change comes with personal sacrifice and ultimately 
depends on physical and col- lective protest. Rather than oppose either weak or strong ties, 
I consider political struggles to inhabit both perspectives. This means  that, depending on 
other factors,  the internet can be useful and useless (Alexander & Aouragh, 2011). By 
adopting an ethnographic view of Lebanese activism, this article shows the relative 
importance of both kinds of ties.
The activists I met with during fieldwork use the internet very prominently. The people I 
quote and refer to in this article are not intended to represent the Lebanese social-political 
landscape, far from it. Rather, Hani, Moussa, Reem and others present a slice of the 
activist/political scene of 2010 in particular, and they are politically diverse in terms of 
confession, political issues and political denominations.3 Nevertheless, despite their diversity, 
they share a rejection of the liberal/reformist and right-wing spec- trum and are keen to see the 
dominant (sectarian, sexist, racist, capitalist) norms of society challenged. The fruition of 
certain grassroots protests discussed below indicate that Lebanese political activism is fluid 
and rich. Through participant observation and the interviews I conducted, I came to realise 
that while the political is personal and thus far more than leisure as sometimes portrayed, 
political activism is above all a difficult task that depends on collective strategies and long-
term commitment.
Many activists are aware of the complexities they are working against and understand 
that they cannot be fixed by  a one-fits-all activism. Furthermore, when asked about the 
difficulties faced, respondents often referred to sectarianism. An in-depth analysis of this  
subject  is  outside  the scope of this article. But, because the debate about sectarianism 
risks straying into generalisations about Lebanon, I will discuss how impervious 
sectarianism remains both in the online realm and the potential solutions offered by 
cyberspace.
Sectarianism and the emergence of a new left
Whilst accepting that there are important cultural, social, religious and linguistic traits that are 
broadly shared across Arab countries, we need a specific understanding of Lebanon’s 
political-historic reality, and of why this reality weakens the promise of activism in Lebanon. 
Lebanese society inherited social fragmentation and regional antagonism from the era of 
colonial rule and this continues to shape today’s politics in Lebanon. A contributing 
frustration is that domestic parties usually behave accord- ing to the interests of their (proxy) 
sect leaders. Acknowledging this colonial and domestic angle is essential because when 
tribal, sectarian or confessional divisions are analysed only from a cultural perspective, 
they leave the impression of a pre-modern (primordial) phenomenon that is impervious to 
change. As Makdisi (2000) and others have shown, traditional ways of doing politics evolved 
to a large extent under the influence of external interference. Sectarianism is intimately 
related to social crises and cynically exploits the dynamics of capitalism. Sectarianism 
maintains the dominant relations and tends to come to the surface during shifts in the modes 
of production, i.e. sectarian ten- sions are not an antidote to modern politics but a reflection 
of their inherent contradictions (Chit, 2012). Hence, disputes over land ownership or regional 
tensions are sometimes incorrectly redefined as ‘sectarian’.
To obtain an insightful understanding of Lebanon’s online media context, sectarianism 
should be seen not ‘simply’ as a practice of divide and rule, which only appears from the top 
to the bottom, but rather as integrated in many aspects of society, including the internet. 
Moreover, Lebanon has a rich history of anti-sectarian subversion and its movements are 
well aware of the disastrous outcomes of sectarianism. In order to assess the anti-sectarian 
and sectarian legacy together we need a joint analy- sis. One of the clearest examples of 
such a strand is given by Fawaz Traboulsi in his three-way descrip- tion of Lebanon’s political 
structure as consisting of the institutionalisation of religious sects, a liberal economic system 
based on the service sector, and a problematic regional relationship (Traboulsi, 2007). 
This suggests that the very causes and complications of capitalist development are 
encoded in religious-sectarian semantics. Such an  approach—in  light  of  increasing  
urbanisation and the changing class politics—offers a space within which to ask whether 
changing ‘objective con- ditions’ can affect the sectarian-secular equation.
Although anti-sectarian struggles are written out of mainstream scholarship about 
Lebanon, dis- obedience in regard to sectarian classifications is a large part of the 
collective identity and raison- d’etre of the left (Haugbolle, 2013: 437). Lebanese leftism is 
defined by its opposition to the sectarian quota system, which, despite the peace agreement 
in 1991, was never abolished (Yacoub, 2014). But rather than representing a homogeneous 
and self-contained group, the inter-relational position of
different communities occurs in accordance with social shifts. The presence of the left, for 
instance, impacted the way the nominal positions of different communities changed 
overtime. Historically, Shia and Druze identities have been fluid; the failure of the secular 
project (in which both groups were heavily involved) indicates the growing communal 
consciousness, as Hazran (2013) demon- strates. The crucial role of Druze in the 
Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) and Shia in the Communist Party (LCP) hint at their class 
rather than sectarian motives (idem, p.170). Thus secularism  has become constitutive of 
what it means to be ‘leftist’—and as important as anti-imperialism in this regard.
These examples inevitably remind us that society is greatly influenced by social 
struggles. Leba- nese society is well versed in grassroots politics, with or without the 
involvement of digital media. During earlier fieldwork (2001–2003) about internet usage in 
Palestinian refugee camps, I had wit- nessed the mass demonstrations that took place in 
response to Israel’s military actions in Palestine and to the invasion of Iraq. It is against the 
backdrop of these major events and the concurrent emer- gence of a relatively new 
independent left that activists’ critiques of sectarianism grew louder. Whereas the 
demonstrations against the assassination of Prime Minister Hariri in 2005  (then named 
Cedar Revolution or Independence Intifada) saw the biggest outpouring of  people,  this 
period also saw the subduing of grassroots elements and, paradoxically, deepened of 
existing sectar- ian schisms by what became two opposing ‘blocs’. Thus, decisions around 
issues that groups could agree about were sometimes hindered by the messy webs of 
local allegiances.
The link between sectarianism and contemporary activism is partly related to generational 
proxi- mity to (or memories of) the civil war. The ‘post memory’ school (Haugbolle, 2010; 
Larkin, 2012; Sawalha, 2010) provides a significant framework in this regard. 
Contestations over history as well as the enforced cessation of questions about the civil 
war continue. This goes beyond reconciliation in relation to the bad past—sometimes it is 
actually a matter of repairing what was already good. For example, Sawalha illustrates how 
the district of ‘Ain el Mreisse used to constitute a space of diversity that transcended 
sectarian politics, but that this space has been threatened by the actions of power- ful elites 
(connected to the Solidere project of certain construction magnates) who ascribe a very 
different meaning to these social spaces’ (2010: 69).
Thus, memory, the politics of representation, demands for justice and belief in secular 
ethics are intertwined. However, Lebanon seems to lack the mechanisms with which it might 
properly concede this affinity. Larkin (2012) reminds us that Beiruti youths growing up after 
the war rely on inherited narratives. Indeed, some of these chronicles are never-ending and 
never tired of reiterating the civil war, as if the epic resistance of the past confers upon 
present parties a kind of transferred glory. When old apprehensions linger in the present, a 
dynamic arises in which the new generation finds itself only able to exercise a certain degree 
of freedom. In this regard, the events of 2005 and 2006 provoked references to the civil 
war. Thus, activists interested in anti-sectarian politics may have stumbled against what 
AbiYaghi et al. (forthcoming) call ‘sectarian ghosts’. Yet it is important to remember that 
in the first decade after the end of the civil war (1991) new political progressive 
possibilities began to emerge. Yacoub (2014: 93) refers to the activities of the General 
Confederation of Lebanese Workers (CGTL) in the mid-1990s, the No Frontiers Group at the 
American University of Beirut (AUB), the People’s Movement (which protested the growing 
neoliberalism and the increasingly pro-US pol- icies of the new Hariri government), as the 
signs of a new left. These experiences stimulated the emer- gence of the Democratic Left 
Movement, partly out of a split within the Communist Party.4 Plenty of examples encountered 
during fieldwork illustrated that activist groups are actively—through public workshops and 
political magazines (Figure 2)—ignoring ghosts and constructing their own present; their 
political projects (including secularism) matter relative to their current lived experiences.
My respondents were uncomfortable with analyses that were mostly interested in 
confessional animosity. They would tell me that Lebanese sectarianism is not an overarching 
system that  is immune to domestic or regional pressures. Yet, many of their (negative) 
examples suggested, in turn, that sectarianism was sustained by a complex system of 
checks and balances, one that often sabotages their efforts to counter sectarianism. Hence, 
I initially regarded the reluctance of activists
Figure 2. Photo fieldwork summer 2010, Socialist Days gathering and Al Manshour magazine.
to discuss sectarianism as a form of political anaesthesia—not wanting to be confronted 
with that actuality—especially because they  themselves often described  how parties  
neutralised their labours. I soon shared the reluctance of my interlocutors because 
projections such as anaesthesia are in essence a form of political pathologising—they 
avoid political complexities and remove the agency of actors. In fact, what this 
contradiction between refusing an emphasis on sectarianism and acknowledging the role 
of sectarianism in their activism actually showed was their constant negotiation between 
gloom and hope.
This relates, in a sense, to the way in which the Arab revolutionary movements came (to 
some) as a surprise. Revolution was never really a relevant framework and yet it was 
something my respondents took quite seriously. During fieldwork in 2010 a number of 
interviewees pointed to the growing pro- tests across the region. This was before those 
protests had been accorded any serious academic attention—after all, social movements 
and protests were deemed  irrelevant  in  many  studies  of Arab politics. As several 
commentators have noted, scholars who ascribed to notions of ‘authoritarian resilience’ when 
explaining Middle East politics had allowed the voices from the movements to be 
neglected, and this increased the need to re-insert ideology into analyses of the reasons, 
conditions and objectives of activists (Bayat, 2011; Haugbolle, 2012; Pace & Cavatorta, 
2012).
It was exactly this dualism of hope and gloom that began to make a difference for 
Hani, a blogger and  graphic designer in  his  late  twenties  from  Beirut.  During our  
second interview  in the summer of 2010, he mentioned that something was brewing: 
there were groups of protes- ters who were talking and behaving differently. They could 
not be simply explained according to the divisive blocs or existing party politics. Hani 
regarded these protesters with exhilaration, anticipating something significant:  ‘One  of  
the  most  important  changes  in  the  Arab  world  is the growing protests against our 
regimes.’ His tone and assumptions were  a break from the Lebanese activist  navel-
gazing  I  had  occasionally  encountered.  He  considered  their  activism  to be part of a 
regional change. In Lebanon this meant  standing  up  to  a  system  rather  than against 
people’s separate community or sect—an ambition that  was  too  often  dismissed  as 
naïve because sectarianism was deemed to be too  strong  to  overcome.  However,  these  
ideas were extremely relevant, and were soon given credence. Neither Hani nor I had 
any idea how prophetic his statement would turn out to be, but three months later, as 
protests first shook Sidi Bouzid and soon erupted  in  many  other  cities  and  towns  in  
Tunisia,  followed  by  Egypt and Morocco and other countries, I remembered his words. 
They offered another form of Leba- nese politics, not only a form of politics that went 
beyond the singular state but one far surpass- ing binary ‘blocs’ politics. Reviewing this 
period, I am reminded of Sami Hermez’ reference to a desire to restore karama, dignity 
(2011: 531), as (a belated) part of the motivation for the pro- tests. This view is one that 
acknowledges both the hardships of repression but also the possibi- lities of change.
Meanwhile, wide-ranging debates that took place in 2011 led to the creation of a 
framework for understanding these dramatic politico-historic shifts. The uprisings certainly 
produced popular per- spectives about political mobilisation that regard the internet as an 
alternative public sphere that transforms political activism; the BBC report referred to at the 
start of this article is a case in point. I still wondered whether the online political sphere 
offered an alternative space for an  already growing alternative politics. For it seems that 
while the 2005 events were divisive, activists were able to unite again on a practical base 
during the 2006 war.
The dread of war and the rise of the internet
For at least the first two years following the 2011 uprisings (until the ‘Arab Winter’ was 
announced) media outlets dedicated unrelenting time and space to the role of the internet in 
the ‘Arab Spring’. With numerous special issues, conferences and workshops, the promises 
of the internet were also a central theme for media and communication studies. As 
discussed elsewhere (Aouragh, 2016), a growing number of contributions to scholarship 
have demonstrated the growth of internet-based activism in the Arab world. The potential 
of online politics in regard to the popular uprisings was also discussed by central figures in 
the Arab internet arena (Sami Ben Gharbia,  Wael  Abbas, Hossam al-Hamalawy).5 A 
recurrence in these (appropriately sober) contributions was the emphasis on a longer 
history of the technology–activism nexus that took into account a regional sense of soli- 
darity (large protests for Palestine and Iraq) and its manifestation among internet users. Both 
dynamics were part of the Lebanese activist scene.
When interface script became Arab-friendly, activists were able to connect more 
intensely with other activists, locally and abroad—the shared language further consolidated 
fraternal relations across the region. For instance, it allowed groups to exchange advice 
about ways to bypass surveil- lance and censorship. Arab Bloggers summits were 
organised in the region in the mid-2000s. In the region, Egypt was certainly a crucial node, 
but Beirut became a hub (and sometimes a refuge) in itself. Regional blogger meetings were 
very political and included debates about state censorship and how to organise solidarity 
with arrested bloggers across the region (Menassat, 2008a). This political-techno 
crystallisation allowed additional networks to fertilise. The growing enthusiasm intensified 
further as grassroots protests grew—and, as Egyptian blogger Noha Atef has argued 
(2011), some bloggers played a heroic role by exposing state  oppression,  including  the  
beating  and  murder  of  Khaled Said by Egyptian police, which later became the spark 
for the Egyptian revolution.6 The existing links between bloggers in Yemen, Morocco, Syria 
and Lebanon helped broaden the different protests that erupted in 2011. The link between 
digital politics and offline movements wasn’t always logical in the Lebanese context.
Analyzing what sparked the political appropriation of the internet by activists, I discerned 
two key- moments: the 2005 rift in the political landscape after Hariri’s death, which I 
discussed earlier, and the July 2006 war.7 It struck me that the 33-day war waged by Israel 
in 2006—which gave rise to hun- dreds of thousands of internal refugees, resulted in over 
1,400 dead and destroyed large parts of the country—prompted such an upbeat spirit.  
Involvement  in  emergency  relief  during  the  July war of 2006, paradoxically, rejuvenated 
some of  the  self-organising  and  independent  networks that had existed before the 2005 
schisms and before the sense of collective defeat that arose after the invasion of Iraq. This 
is reminiscent of the post civil-war youths a decade earlier, who were poli- ticised during 
their participation in the People’s Relief Foundation (which itself was founded during the 
civil war by communist doctors) during the 1996 Israeli attack on the southern town of 
Qana. Numerous interviews suggested that this moment contributed to the mobilisation of 
a new gener- ation of activists through a new form of engagement around humanitarian 
aid, with thousands of internally displaced families scattered and South Lebanon, in 
particular, the site of enormous damage. Many refugees flocked to Beirut where most of 
the activists or political groups already resided. The same period saw a synchronisation of 
Lebanese media (mainstream,  alternative, citizen  and  corporate)  with  many  of  the  
political  groups  and  activists.  Most  political  sides  were
reunited online in their anger at the pro-Israeli bias that was evident in international media. 
The Leba- nese blogosphere was encouraged  by the crucial  need to provide Lebanon-
based information in response to Israeli propaganda. Blogs were being created for this 
purpose, such as Beirut Journal and Siege Notes (Harb, 2009). This convergence helps us 
to understand the evolution of the internet. The timing of these specific events also 
implicated the situated practices that emanated.
In the face of the military invasion in 2006, and the mentioned risk of civil war hovering 
over the shoulders of activists, the idea of ‘online activism’ felt rather alien—the internet was 
prone to being subjected to reductionist assumptions of the kind that lacked a 
conceptualisation of its dialectical nature. During an insightful interview, 25-year-old activist 
Reem from Beirut described internet poli- tics as ‘what you do on the ground.’ She, 
perhaps counter-intuitively, rejected the assumption that she was part of a ‘new’ 
generation of internet-savvy activists. Everything she said confirmed that the online does 
not negate the offline—because it simply cannot do so. In fact, activists  in Lebanon had 
very little in common with the image conjured up by labels like ‘clicktivism’ or ‘slackti- vism’. 
Many were pragmatic about the dawning digital possibilities. Even if visual rhetoric is often 
part of political mediation, especially in this particular phase of the struggle, they were rarely 
interested in spectacle itself. Elevating cyberspace as the spectre of creative politics was 
rare due to the sense of urgency. I wish to tease out this inter-relation further. For instance, 
despite my preoccupation with cyberspace as (potentially) offering a new activist venue, my 
interlocutors increasingly drew me to physical places during fieldwork.
From Sit-ins to cafes: physical prominence of politics
Local activism relies on its own rules of engagement. During 2008, activism was particularly 
fuelled by anxieties about the fragile state of politics and the difficulty of organising around a 
secular (non-sec- tarian) position. The activists I met were not exclusively involved with the 
internet in the way that the notion of online activism would seem to suggest. Rather, they 
instrumentalised the internet as part of their grassroots activism. This overlap has given rise 
to another familiar debate  among  activists related to the priority of (physical) place over 
(virtual) space.
If the many discussions in which I participated in the aftermath of the 2006 devastation 
showed me one thing, it is that activists recall demonstrations, sit-ins and occupations of 
public squares more vividly than their online actions. They put huge effort into holding mass 
protests in physical spaces for almost two years in a row. The occupations of the two big 
squares in the capital city by the two main blocs can be seen as the antecedents of Tahrir 
Square, with the obvious difference that elements of the state, in the form of various political 
parties, were involved in the protests.8 First, there was the ‘Truth’ campaign (demanding 
Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon), which occupied Martyr Square in the centre of Beirut, 
where Rafiq al-Hariri was buried. After his burial, the square very quickly became 
associated with the 14 March coalition. Then, after the 2006 war, Riyad al-Solh Square (a 
stone’s throw away from Martyr Square) became the most important  site  of  contestation,  
occupied  by what was then known as the 8 March coalition, in protest against UN 
Security Council Resolution
What started as an incidental protest organised by political parties grew into a 
permanent
sit-in that included many groups. This occupation, lasting almost a year, involved different 
sections of the left.
The Riad al-Solh sit-in, aside from its political purpose, was at the same time a 
pleasant space. Some corners felt particularly domestic as they were transformed into 
living rooms, where people brought their comfortable sofas. There was nargila (water pipe) 
smoke and coffee brewing through- out. During New Year’s Eve, different parties scattered 
around the area, especially for the high point of the evening, when the famous singer 
Sabah—invited by Michel Aoun (see footnote 9)—appeared on stage. This made sense 
because the political leaders were well aware that they the people had to be entertained; 
rewarded for their loyalty. The sit-in had a symbolic value; it sent a significant message 
about the strength of the political parties and coalitions involved. It was a venue for critics to 
come together to meet other like-minded people. There were also critical debates about the 
sit-in being a
public flexing of muscles between powerful groups for agendas that do not benefit ordinary 
people. Some considered it imperative to challenge the schism between the two dominant 
blocs (March 8 and 14) that did not necessarily give them a voice and pondered 
alternative options.
2008 was an extraordinary year for clashes between opposing parties. One respondent 
described the atmosphere of this time as a ‘sense that this country always seems on the 
verge of war’. Particu- larly, the role of the most important Lebanese armed group, 
Hezbollah, was an important part of the discussion. When I returned for fieldwork in 2008, 
the live speeches by Nasrallah were a fascinating phenomenon the way that people 
watched almost breathlessly when Hassan Nasrallah appeared in public to make a speech 
seemed hyperbolic. Once, whilst taking a taxi back from a visit to friends in the Palestinian 
refugee camp Bourj al-Barajne, the driver turned up the volume and drove slowly, in order to 
listen to the speech of Nasrallah at length. On another occasion, I was in T-Marbouta in the 
central part of Hamra waiting for a friend. This vibrant café, where many activists hung out 
(and still do), was a space for discussion. A projector was brought out, the noise of the 
people faded and many turned their chairs to watch the speech on the beige wall. As we all 
listened intently, I asked Khaled, a socialist and fearless LGBTQ activist, whether this level of 
interest signified a pro-Hezbollah position. He said this was not the point. Between parts of 
Nasrallah’s speech, he explained that, whatever one’s politics, what Nasrallah said was 
important. The speech included warnings regarding the border with Israel. Khaled stated: 
‘This [Israel] concerns the whole country and will have an impact on all of us’. At that point, in 
2008, during a lock-down of the parliament, there were very violent clashes throughout the 
city. In these weeks the Lebanese blogosphere was dominated by these events, many 
responding to the spike in the sectarian tension that the clashes had caused (Menassat, 
2008b).
Considering decades of aggression and the renewed memories of 2006, Khaled’s words 
were not an understatement. They reflect common fears about what might occur due to the 
tensions between political parties. The nature of this fear depended on the activists’ opinions 
regarding Hezbollah. The intricate relation between activists and Hezbollah cannot be 
reduced to a single type: for some it was negatively influenced by experiences on the 
ground,10 while for others admiration was limitless (to the point of uncritical support) due 
to the threat of Israel. These disagreements also fed online debates. Some became 
frustrated in 2010 when they received no concrete support for issues, such as Palestinian 
rights, to which the party provided plenty of lip-service. Thus ‘the left’ is not a homo- 
geneous constituency. Hezbollah’s growing investment in state representation as its main 
target for achieving power meant that it did not support some of the activists’ grassroots 
aims when the party did not see any benefit from them. One related observation made to 
me later in the same evening was that these internal and armed divisions sucked the 
energy out of grassroots initiatives. I won- dered whether digital media could form a public 
sphere that pushes against the dominant balance of forces, could put an end, or at least 
reduce, to historical resentments by reframing it. Can online communities help render 
sectarian allegiances as something outmoded?
The emergence of Lebanon’s’ cyberspace
Is Lebanese cyberspace a counter-hegemonic force that challenges the mainstream public 
sphere? It is indisputable that there is much more media diversity in our digital age. The 
internet is fed by existing social sources, and may replicate existing antagonisms, but for 
the same reason it may also be a secular force and accommodate the discourses of anti-
sectarian movements. More important is to understand how a Lebanese cyberspace came 
about in the first place, when and during which con- ditions did it emerge? Here we 
discover that Lebanon’s rich journalism culture plays a key role. At their peak, Lebanese 
bloggers became a key source and were read as much as well-known newspa- pers 
(Saghbini, 2010). As the internet became more widespread, blogs disrupted the split 
between mainstream (offline) and alternative (online) media, yet the antagonism remained. 
In due course, some of the bloggers became integrated as online columnists for some of 
the biggest news sites (AL-Akhbar, As-Safir). Interestingly, initially online English-language 
websites were overwhelmingly affiliated with 14 March, while Arab-language websites 
were associated with 8 March (Menassat,
2007). Moreover, Alexa-based listings showed that the biggest Lebanese websites were 
often party- affiliated (and funded). Blogs were also an important link to the homeland for 
Lebanon’s very large diaspora (Haugbolle, 2007).11 In fact, several bloggers I met were 
themselves returnees from east Africa or South America.
Thus the way in which the internet operates cannot be grasped without considering the 
larger socio-media ecology of Lebanon. Two basic qualifications help unravel the 
development of a Leba- nese cyberspace: the media ecology was already extraordinarily 
diverse and Lebanese activists ben- efitted from a more open media policy. At the time of 
fieldwork in mid-2000s, there was no clear policy for the internet: the regulation of online 
public opinion showed many grey areas.  These broader freedoms (especially compared to  
other  Arab  activists)  must  be  acknowledged,  though the continuity of random arrests 
attest to the looming insecurity (Ghattas, 2015).
Interlocutors I met during my fieldwork often spoke of the Hariri assassination as being a 
backlash against their activism: it was a phase that was followed by a suffocating entrapment 
within rival blocs. By contrast, the 2006 war, despite its horrors, saw the revival of 
independent activism. That period unleashed an enthusing dynamism. Activists worked 
round the clock, filling the gap left (or aban- doned) by the state. Hani’s political activism 
increased when he joined the activist-led relief collective Samidoun.12 His experience of this 
time left a deep impact on Hani. It did not demoralise him because he felt he made a 
difference. Under the pen-name Hanibael, he passionately commented on politics but 
transformed from a politically engaged blogger into an on-the-ground activist who used 
the internet.
This type of grassroots relief has been described as the ‘politics of care’. I agree here with 
Mognieh (2015) that the difference between resisting war and participating in neutral 
humanitarian relief lies in the factor of political commitment to solidarity and protest. In 
2006 such engagement inspired a radical international solidarity campaign against the 
Israeli war, and was far removed from the ‘market of aid’ that emerged in the post-war 
professionalisation of relief. Relief soon encapsulated into all sorts of norms and values of 
aid, but that momentary space did have an important impact on the life of a number of 
activists that I met. The specific ‘temporality’ of the summer of 2006 became an 
‘opportunity’—a mediation between political structures and personal agency, as described 
in social movement theories.13 This is why ‘opportunities’ includes personal commitments 
born in particular moments that connect ‘prospective’ activists with an ‘opportunity’ for 
protest (Passy & Monsch, 2014: 27).
For Hani this mostly took place in the media and communication subgroup. He helped 
set up an online repository that contained information about the families fleeing 
bombardments in the South (such as their time of arrival in Sanayeh park in Beirut; how 
long they stayed; when they left; where they headed), which enabled people to find lost 
family members and provide follow-up care. As Hani put it: ‘Our organisational structure was 
effective. The electronic log was not costly so we could use it as long as we had internet 
access. If you know how to use it, you can actually make a difference.’ These examples 
can be seen as the more basic forerunners of online emergency crowd-sourcing, or crisis 
mapping initiatives that appeared, for instance, during the uprisings in Tunisia  and 
Egypt.14 When I asked what  difference  such  micro-level  digital contributions  made,  
especially  in the face of the larger political crisis, Hani explained,
In Lebanon, each sect has its own media. But no one ‘owns’ our social media; there is no political 
party, organ- isation or authority that controls media. You could say it is a little anarchist, not 
centralised. There are so many cases we would not have known about [through mainstream media] if it 
wasn’t for exposure online.
The 2006 events sped up the domestication of the internet: they did not yet make it a 
deﬁnitive part of activist spaces and narratives, but they did bring about the end of the 
phase in which internet usage was reserved for experts. The internet became an item of 
mass consumption. The trajectory of blogging in Lebanon shows us how political internet 
usage established (and shaped) news pro- duction. Before the advent of social media 
during the campaigns in 2008 and 2010  the  most obvious online public sphere was the 
blogosphere. Lebanon Aggregator, for example, still offers a
slice of the Lebanese blogosphere, especially its reﬂection on the 2005 split after the 
assassination of Hariri and the retreat of Syrian forces.15 This archive of Lebanese blogs 
shows no ‘immunity’ to the 8/ 14 March blocs. Such old listings illustrate that activists used 
cyberspace in many different ways. In a way, this conﬁrms earlier studies about the 
political blogosphere functioning as an echo-chamber rather than as a bridge between 
opposing groups (cf. O’Neil, 2009).
These findings made me realise that by focusing on the difference between online and 
offline poli- tics I tended to ask the wrong question, and in fact was applying a dichotomous 
approach instead of seeking to understand the overlapping dynamics. To try to achieve a 
better understanding of online engagement as a form of political agency, I divided the 
conceptual ‘field’ into political activists who use the internet and internet users that are very 
politicised. This division is never absolute—many intersections occur and the volatile nature 
of politics already sharpens the debate about what is con- sidered activism. For some of the 
activists I encountered, the internet was not the main form of poli- tics. Rather, it became an 
instrument, an integral part of their life in ways I had not encountered before. Thus, 
although cyberspace is not exempt from the impact of sectarian antagonism, we can 
assume that sectarian tension and especially war did speed up the growth and popularity of 
cyber- space. Moreover, rather than setting these up against each other, offline activism 
needs online-gen- erated agency. However, such mixed-method mobilisations are not always 
possible because the benefits of online activism are neither diffused equally nor impervious  
to  material  damage.  A closer look at the genealogy of Internet politcs brings both 
conditions (war-effected infrastructure and war-induced politicisation) together.
Genealogy of cyber-politics
In a post-war context, where the infrastructure is fragile, regular electricity access is not 
always avail- able. It struck me in 2008 that video-related content was sporadically 
available and only sparsely included in mobilisation materials. The low number of views of 
the most-discussed videos surprised me. I came to realise that this was not the result of poor 
technological skills. Rather, it had to do with the material conditions with respect to the 
internet: it did not make much sense to adopt YouTube as part of activists’ overall online 
tactics because bandwidth was low.
In 2010 YouTube clips (e.g. video collages of protests and the edited clips of historic 
events) and videos were increasingly embedded in blogs and Facebook posts. However, 
even then the buffer time (loading) for a clip was around three times the duration  of  the  
clip—meaning  that  one would have to wait 10 minutes to watch a three minutes clip. 
This was a direct consequence of the damaged infrastructures during the civil war and 
subsequent military assault by Israel (1996, 2006). Despite these material challenges, 
blogs and social media were to some degree challenging conventional Lebanese politics 
between 2006–2010.
Certain individuals who were (re-) politicised during the mid-2000s were a key link 
between the internet and political activism. One of the political bloggers and critics I came 
to know  was Moussa. He started blogging with Geocities and Yahoo SiteBuilder and then 
in 2003 moved on to Blogspot: ‘I had to try every new technology that was popping up.’ 
His first internet access was via a slow dial-up phone line in 1995: ‘The ISP person who 
downloaded Cyberia through Netscape for me explained, “Ok, this is your browser” and 
went on to show how to access persiankitty.com.’ Moussa suggested that this X-rated 
website was one of the popular motivations for teenage boys to enter  the  net. Moussa 
became increasingly vocal during  the  July 2006  war  on  Lebanon. Like many Lebanese at 
this time he had no interest in exercising restraint about his response to the atro- cities that 
were taking place and the accompanied Western media bias. He went into radical blogging 
mode. He thought out loud and felt that maybe this was a substitute for the failure of the 
activism he himself had personally experienced before. In those past years he had honed 
his keyboard skills in venting about Iraq, and this had helped him in his own evolution as 
a blogger. Searching for the right words, he told me: ‘The invasion was like a castration 
… it was just overwhelming.’ For him, the retreat of Israel from South Lebanon and the 
Palestinian Intifada were part of a struggle that
was motivating—whereas Iraq was humiliating. To a certain extent 2006 determined his style 
of blog- ging. He was taking notes and pictures in the areas hit by Israeli war planes and 
would feed them to international audiences: ‘I wrote in English because I wanted the West 
to see our suffering.’
Moussa’s own readership grew and he began picking up ideas from other blogs too and 
fed these to Global Voices,  for which he  had just started a Lebanon section.16 The additional 
bloggers he recruited also became correspondents, further enriching Lebanese 
representations in the global pol- itical blogosphere. It was not just seeding for Global 
Voices that restored some of his hope. Meeting many other clever and joyful bloggers, such 
as the people behind Remarkz and Jamal’s Propaganda, was also inspiring.17 These blogs 
suggested that cyberspace could be a locus for already opinionated people who were 
seeking an alternative public space, and also that it was an overwhelmingly ironic or cynical 
milieu. Taken together, a clearer way to conceptualise the internet is to consider it as part of 
the means—and an indirect source of activism—that aims to end injustice or sectarianism.
This process continued and by 2010 Lebanon saw an increasing number of campaigns 
led by pro- gressive activists. When compared to the dichotomous choice between the 
existing political parties, let alone the bleak choice between war and resistance, these 
campaigns offered a breath of fresh air. Tired of being at the mercy of political parties fixed in 
blocs, these activists attempted to intervene of their own accord. Wishing to break with 
sectarianism, they played a key role in mobilising and pre- paring for the secularism march 
in April 2010. At an analytical level, this mobilisation offers a reminder of the nature of 
revolutionary transformations that require a long-durée perspective. They also point to the 
offline-online dialectic to which I now return.
The offline represented online: Nasawiya
Attending different protests and political meetings helped me to uncover the different ways in 
which the internet played a role in my respondents’ daily praxis. They often reflected on their 
relationship with technology, for instance, how would user-generated content affect their 
outreach? Does online decision-making reduce organising time? Does engaging with 
neoliberal platforms negatively impact mobilisation choices in the long run? Is information 
consumption always relevant? Some of the discus- sions debated the political component of 
what later became known as the fear of missing out (FOMO) and how reliance on the internet 
makes this part of activism’s genetics. Some activists mockingly called online engagement and 
the preoccupation with mediating everything online masturbation. 27-year-old Tony from Zahle, 
who at the time was living in Beirut, insisted on describing himself only as ‘secular.’ For him the 
increased prominence of the internet was negatively changing the objectives of protest itself, 
pushing aside strategic planning and self-critique.18 The focus on online activism, Tony argued, 
is mostly about ‘making noise.’ Due to the platform type and medium, this is a noise that 
promotes individual politics over collective work, and one that engenders the ‘professional 
activist.’ Taking these critiques seriously, I turn to one particular group for whom collective 
self-empowerment was at the core of their ethics and an approach that encouraged a better 
balance between offline and online activism.
Nasawiya started in Beirut in 2010, partly as a follow-up to a group called ‘The Feminist 
Collec- tive.19 The name itself (meaning feminist) was meant to counter the social and 
discursive marginali- sation of feminism, as both idea and practice. Nasawiya critiques 
social movements’ lack of engagement with queer politics, an absence that is partly related 
to the broad projection of Lebanon as a ‘liberal’ society, where women are freer than 
anywhere else in the Arab world. The group’s organisational structure is unconventional 
too: it has adopted a collective rather than a hier- archic approach. Challenging the 
dominant way in which civil society has developed, Nasawiya has avoided the route of 
many NGOs that rely on foreign or state funding, in order to maintain its inde- pendence 
and ensure its sustainability. Their work contested the objectification of Lebanese women 
and focused on legal discrimination, such as the inability to transfer their nationality to 
their hus- bands or children,  a right  only granted to men.  At the  time of  fieldwork, they 
had organised a series of  videos on  gender and  sexuality, as  well as  a number of  
animated stories dealing with sexual  harassment.20   Their  discursive  and  visual  
communication  is  unmistakable:  they  choose  to
attack the status quo because the existing legal and political system provides no solution. 
Hence, rather than avoiding issues that are highly contested, they explicitly target those 
domains through vernacular means which I want to tease out.
Much of Nasawiya’s work involves solidarity with migrant workers (especially the 
ubiquitous case of ‘suicides’ among domestic workers, mostly female). The anti-racism 
groups that had seen small yet symbolic successes were becoming sturdier (Figure 3). One 
example at the time of my fieldwork in 2010 concerned the (secretly) filmed rejection of a 
black woman trying to enter a beach resort. Whereas many would  have  acknowledged  
the  practice  of  excluding  migrants  from  private beaches or pools, representing this kind of 
racism explicitly on video was confrontational and there- fore received much attention.21 A 
simultaneous development has been Nasawiya’s vocal critique of laws that legalised rape 
within marriage (e.g. the campaign Delete522, a reference to the number of the legal 
resolution) or that prevent women passing on their Lebanese nationality to their child or 
husband. In terms of the latter, Nasawiya has helped set up a campaign to demand 
citizenship for children of Lebanese mothers—a very complex and sensitive issue. They 
exposed how (by obstruct- ing equal citizenship), demographic settings were the country’s 
tool for exercising confessional control.22 They rephrased their demand, making it an 
unconditional one: including also Lebanese women married to Palestinian men—the most 
controversial category.
As noted above, the low-quality and the material inequality of the internet shapes 
activists’ pos- sibilities. Existing technological infrastructures can impede the effect of 
technological applications and their functionalities with regards to mobilisation. It therefore 
helps to activate certain (wired) acti- vists who have much better technological access than 
others (e.g. on campus). They are brokers— between online/offline tactics, 
Lebanese/international news and activist/civil society groups. I wit- nessed  Nasawiya  
activists  participate  in  the  emergency  demonstrations  for  a  Sudanese  man  on
Figure 3. From left to right, Migrants Task Force; still of leaked Beach Segregation; screenshot Facebook page Jinsiyati Lajawzi wa 
Waladi.
hunger strike in protest of his rejected appeal for asylum. Sometimes they released videos 
of police brutality or statements concerning their own safety. One of the key organisers, 
Reem, adds,
If it wasn’t for the people screaming online all day long, only a small fraction of the people would have 
known about the arrest of X in Nahr al-Bared [a fellow activist who was arrested for entering a 
cordoned Palestinian refugee camp]. Without the swift response on Facebook or blogs urging everyone  
to  contact  the  security offices, I don’t think she would have been released.
Nasawiya may have punched above its weight, an issue that is conﬁrmed by the acts of 
violence they have been subject to a number of times.23 The swift responses coordinated 
online echoed via media contacts abroad and, in fact, mobilised the local media, which, in 
turn, helped trigger a response and solidarity. The brokers are often well-connected activists 
with a large number of contacts and, as such, they become key during particular or 
concrete cases and moments. Reem states: ‘Our skills are matched by whatever we know  
about  the  basics  of  websites,  video-editing,  photo-shopping:  all the things that you need 
for activism.’
We now better understand the importance of the technical training members of Nasawiya 
receive but also offer. Nasawiya’s initiative ‘Take Back the Tech’ relates efforts around gender 
with technology. At their workshops women of all ages are trained (by women) in programming 
and editing.24 Yet, while Nasawiya uses the internet to reach out to girls and women, it is 
aware of the risk of missing those who are not online. In addition to having a strong presence 
offline, they therefore prioritise physical meet- ings and protests. This is put into practice by 
Nasawiya Café, a place to meet, but also a resource centre. For them on/offline activism is 
mostly that which you ‘do;’ their activism occurs mainly with offline counterparts. But as they 
confront the material manifestations of the unequal, sexist and racist system they wish to 
dismantle, they manage, mobilise and revamp a great deal of it online.
It is important to remember that the internet is not crucial (or relevant) for all activists or 
at all times: some tools play a significant role, while others only become meaningful much 
later on. Political subjectivities are shaped in part by the internet, whether this is intended 
(because they prioritise face- to-face communication) or not (because being offline is a 
consequence of electricity cuts). Thus to understand the Lebanese left better, I consider 
Nasawiya a  crucial  example  in  many  ways.  The focus on the Lebanese left tends to 
privilege official parties—or the main split/divisions imposed on them (e.g. Yacoub, p. 99), 
but grassroots activism, even if small in number, should not be seen as a side issue. 
Radical progressive experiments like Nasawiya should be taken account of in a ‘mapping’ of 
the Arab left. This left needs an inquiry in its own right as these divergent and relatively new 
actors form the nucleus of a new Arab radical consciousness.
Conclusion
This article has discussed the dynamics of Lebanese activism since the mid-2000s through 
the prism of the internet. Through an ethnographic discussion of the links, networks, and 
ties that forged acti- vist milieus, it has shed light on a time in 2011 that may well be 
considered a revolutionary momen- tum—a period when internet activism attracted a lot of 
attention as a result of its supposed novelty in the Middle East. At first sight this seems an 
innocuous manner in the study of Lebanon. However, a stronger online political presence 
during the latter phases, compared to previous years, is undeniable. In the course of those 
phases, activists creatively adapted digital media into political mobilisation strategies. By 
presenting a view from below, it is possible to grasp the consequences of local condi- 
tionality without which it is difficult to assess the translocal characteristics of internet politics. By 
intro- ducing case studies shaped by a volatile political context, I have shown how the 
promising potential of activism is only partly locked inside the complex socio-material-
confessional system that marks Lebanon. In addition, although the online public sphere is 
embedded in a poor (post-civil war) infor- mation and communication technology (ICT) 
infrastructure, activists nevertheless apply novel ways to manoeuvre around these 
restrictions. I have argued that cyberspace is not immune to sectarian frag- mentation, but 
that it also enables a resurgence of (internet-powered) activism.
To understand the social roots of progressive politics (i.e. constant efforts to challenge 
the domi- nant status-quo), we need to better understand the social transformations that 
have affected Lebanon. Grasping the realities and differences is crucial because 
sectarianism can be a buzzword that obscures more than it enlightens. It also encourages 
a top-down geopolitical reading, which, however comfortable, rarely speaks of personal 
trajectories. In a similar vein, personal grievances or specific political interactions can 
influence activists’ decisions to participate in protest action. I dec- iphered the aftermath of 
the assassination of Hariri and the 2006 Israeli war on Lebanon as two con- tentious 
moments.
As argued throughout this article, there is a dialectical relation between the offline and 
online pol- itical setting. With such a multi-layered analytic treatment layer we realise that 
the internet matters greatly when employed for mobilisation during revolutionary stages that 
also affected Lebanon. Nasawiya is insightful in the challenge it presents to such 
obfuscations. Their social dynamic—inde- pendent from sectarian determinants—sheds a 
light on a rather different lexicon for activism, one that reframes political expressions by 
including race, class and LGBTQ rights. The offline–online dia- lectic assumes a natural link 
but this inter-dependency itself is determined by material realities, such as technological 
access or quality (speed, censorship). During multiple fieldwork visits, my own use of the 
same infrastructure that frustrated my respondents revealed the consequences of a capitalist 
for- profit sector and severely damaged telecommunication infrastructure (hours of electricity 
cuts); and it also revealed that such conditions lead to tactical adaptation. When there are 
limited hours of elec- tricity and internet, one becomes more aware of (and avoids) 
‘meaningless’ activities: internet usage becomes more ‘task oriented.’ A basic style and an 
efficient method is a necessity; it does not indicate a lack of creativity.
The Arab uprisings have had a significant impact on Lebanese activism. The political 
initiatives and protests that formed the uprisings spoke to the imagination and desires of 
thousands of people. The upshot of the Isqat al-Nizam al-Ta’ifi protests during 2011 created 
further exposure for Min Haqqi Ana agenda. In this view, the internet helps amplify activist 
voice, visualise their ideals, and, by turning them into digital artefacts, archive their desires. 
The latter is significant: archiving keeps moments of protest alive. This is relevant as it 
allows memories and sensations to be preserved for other acti- vists: it offers a source of 
political strength that can be drawn upon later—even 11acting as a tem- porary antidote in 
moments of decline. Finally, the 2011 uprisings were not singular events: the grassroots 
experiences and existing indignation were already present and part  of  its  creation. While 
the extremely divided politics of 2005 had drained the air of the oxygen that was 
necessary for autonomous activism,  considering 2006 as  the backdrop  of  the  2010–11  
eruption  of  protest reminds us of the contradictions as well as the ‘permanent’ character of 
revolutions.
Notes
1. Cf. <http://foreignpolicy.com/tag/lebanon/>. The well-known exception is the framing of the  2005  
protests (which I will return to later in the article) known then as the Cedar-Revolution and 
Independence Intifada.
2. The dichotomous debate was entertained by Malcolm Gladwell and Clay Shirky which in due course 
inspired many similar contributions. See: https://www.wired.com/2011/12/gladwell-vs-shirky/.
3. Some of the names have been altered in order to protect their privacy –although some interlocutors 
remain identifiable by their blog names.
4. The Democratic Left Movement collapsed in the wake of the assassination of Hariri, which had a 
negative impact on activist networks that had invested in the Movement (Yacoub 2014, p. 101).
5. For their contributions cf. Riz Khan Show on Al Jazeera English (AJE), 21 January, 2011:< 
http://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=4C56fzPc4i8&feature=related > as  well  as  
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0n3ylF2P4-w>,  (links last accessed on June 2012).
6. The Kifaya movement and the Mahala al-Kobra strikes supported by the April 6 Movement were 
crucial. Atef spoke about her experiences at the Oxford Internet Institute seminar Revolution 2.0? in 
March  2011.  The podcast can be found 
here:<http://webcast.oii.ox.ac.uk/?view=Webcast&ID=20110328_348>.
7. Several researchers studied social movements during the same period. I particularly recommend the 
doctoral research of AbiYaghi (2013) and Rima Majed (2016).
8. 8 March Coalition represents Hezbollah, with its leader Hasan Nasrallah, and Amal both Shia and the 
Free Patriotic Movement, with its leader Michel Aoun Christian. Syria and Iran asonsidered crucial 
allies and the Coalition is often described as ‘pro-resistance’. The Hezbollah and Free Patriotic 
Movement cooperation is the crux of this alliance. The 14 March Coalition (Future Movement, with its 
leader Saad Hariri Sunni, Lebanese Forces Orthodox Christian, Phalange or Kataeb Maronite 
Christian), with US and Saudi as key allies.
9. Resolution 1559 called for the withdrawal of Syrian troops, the disarmament of Hezbollah and new 
elections. While some believed that disarmament would make another occupation by Israel possible, 
the opposition was mainly against the collaboration of PM Seniora with George W Bush administration’s 
imperial project, summarised by Condoleeza Rice’s description of the horrors of 2006 as the ‘birth 
pangs of a new Middle East.’
10. One interviewer related how leftists were blocked in 2006 from joining in fighting Israel in the South, 
another said their convoy could not reach some of the areas to provide civil assistance because they 
were not affiliated with the party. For others unconditional support continued even when Hezbollah 
actively began to support Bashar al- Assad’s crushing of the Syrian uprising, because they considered 
Hezbollah’s survival to be dependent on the survival of Assad.
11. For similar research about blogs see Jurkiewicz (2011) and Taki (2011).
12. Many of the activists who came together already knew each other from the Palestinian solidarity and 
anti-war campaigns. For more about Samidoun, see: http://samidoun.blogspot.com/.
13. This is part of a long debate in the discipline of sociology and has become an important source for 
internet studies as well. For a good review, see Meyer (2004).
14. See for instance the work of Urshahi in Nigeria and Haiti 
here:<http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/ article/review-2011/irrc-884-meier.htm>.
15. See: <http://www.lebanonaggregator.com/>.
16. Global Voices is a community of bloggers around the world who work together and translate voices that 
are not ordinarily heard in mainstream media:< http://globalvoicesonline.org/-/world/middle-east-north-
africa/lebanon/>.
17. See: <http://remarkz.wordpress.com/> and <http://jamalghosn.blogspot.co.uk/>.
18. He eventually wrote a comprehensive critique: see Tony Saghbiny (2015)
19. It is important to return to the earlier period and to recount why this was such a unique experience in 
2009–2010, this reflection does not extend to the period after 2011.
20. In this video the meaning of feminism  is explained by young men and women. Available  at: <http://www. 
youtube.com/watch?v=baGacHimtcc&list=UUf1jJz78tEJaFmFPmJAyBEw&index=4&feature=plcp>. ‘The  
Adven- tures of Salwa’ is an animated narrative that is shown in schools and community centres, 
see:<https://youtu. be/D-S5RLd_-Ks>.
21. Available, respectively, at: <http://mwtaskforce.wordpress.com/tag/antiracism/>; and <http:// 
antiracismmovement.blogspot.com/>. The leaked video of the beach segregation is at: 
<http://www.youtube. 
com/watch?v=fylZa_xPOGA&list=UUaBBARrvSIU9MDzB2_Hj7MQ&index=1&feature=plcp>.
22. The group Jinsiyati Lajawzi wa Waladi is online at: 
<http://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100003333125896&ref= tn_tnmn#!/jensiyyati>.
23. They have, for instance, been attacked by Falange militia men during a picket outside the Palace of 
Justice. The bodyguard of  Nadime  Gemayel rammed his car into the protesters. See: http://english.al-
akhbar.com/node/ 16294.
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